How Do Credit Rating Agencies Rate? An Implementation Perspective on the Assessment of Austerity Programs during the European Debt Crisis by Sager, Fritz & Hinterleitner, Markus
 1 
 
Austerity Programs and their Assessment by Credit Rating Agencies 
during the European Debt Crisis – An Implementation Perspective 
 
Fritz SAGER and Markus HINTERLEITNER 
 
Abstract 
During the recent European debt crisis, credit rating agencies and their ratings had been 
frequent bones of contention. We analyze which factors are considered by credit rating 
agencies when they judge a state’s credibility in implementing an announced austerity 
program. The results of a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis of credit ratings 
show that implementation-related factors had a comparatively minor impact while the 
level of economic competitiveness displayed high explanatory power. The findings 
highlight the desolate implications for less competitive countries that emanate from 
credit ratings and their influence on refinancing costs. While competitive states are 
deemed better able to generate future growth and therefore get positive evaluations, less 
competitive states cannot prevent (further) downgrades in the short or middle-term by 
announcing austerity programs.  
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In several developed economies where the level of debt has risen sharply in recent years 
states have taken measures to avoid spiraling debt and to refinance existing debts on the 
capital markets under acceptable conditions. One such measure used more frequently 
during times of crisis is the austerity program. This is the term used to refer to various 
measures and cuts intended to decrease costs and increase state income, thereby 
reducing debt (Blyth 2013). In Europe, numerous austerity programs have been put into 
place over the last few years. Austerity programs have a particularly high relevance for 
European Union (EU) member states who cannot simply devalue their currency to boost 
competitiveness. Instead, they are forced to resort to internal devaluation mechanisms – 
such as austerity programs – to ensure fiscal sustainability and secure access to capital 
markets (Weisbrot and Ray 2010). 
Since sovereign ratings are an “assessment of each government’s ability and willingness 
to service its debts in full and on time” (Bissoondoyal-Bheenick 2005, 252), announced 
austerity programs are tested by the markets and reviewed in terms of how and whether 
they can be implemented successfully with a view to securing solvency. This process of 
evaluation is dominated by a small number of influential actors, with first and foremost 
the major US credit rating agencies Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch Ratings 
(CRAs). Over the years the significance of their judgments has also increased with 
regard to Europe, where many bank-based coordinated market economies have 
substituted former non-market institutions by external rating practices (Trampusch 
2013). CRAs have become private regulators of international capital markets. Countries 
normally have long standing contracts with CRAs and pay to get rated, as they are 
dependent on the ratings to secure access to capital markets and hold down borrowing 
costs (Kerwer 2005; Archer et al. 2012).  
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Our aim is to shed empirical light on the reaction function of CRAs during the 
European debt crisis. We seek to establish whether countries can halt sovereign rating 
downgrades and secure access to capital markets by announcing an austerity program. 
To this end, we consider the implementation of austerity measures as the 
implementation of a public policy. Based on the conceptual framework by Sabatier and 
Mazmanian (1980; Exadaktylos and Zahariadis 2014), our preliminary assumption is 
that – besides macroeconomic factors – implementation-related factors should be 
considered by CRAs when evaluating an announced austerity program and its likely 
effect on fiscal sustainability. As ratings assess the risk of a state’s ability to service its 
debt and austerity measures are passed in order to decrease this risk, austerity measures 
and rating changes form a peculiar relationship: Austerity measures are a signal to 
capital markets that a state is willing to honor its debt obligations (De Haan and 
Amtenbrink 2011), which in turn needs to be verified for its implementation credibility. 
Accordingly, factors potentially responsible for causing an implementation failure 
should be considered. In this respect, our work differs from other contributions in the 
field which focus primarily on macroeconomic factors and their influence on ratings 
(e.g. Cantor and Packer 1996; Monfort and Mulder 2000; Mora 2006). Most of the 
contributions that have to a certain extent included political factors in the analysis 
(Vaaler et al. 2006; Archer et al. 2007; Beaulieu et al. 2012), have only done so with 
regard to developing countries. Studies explicitly considering both macroeconomic and 
fiscal variables across countries of different level of development have not produced 
unambiguous results (Eijffinger 2012; Hill et al. 2010; Afonso et al. 2011a). A question 
which has not yet been addressed is how CRAs react to the announcement of austerity 
programs. 
The paper proceeds as follows: The next section outlines the importance of CRAs and 
their ratings for the scope of policy-making of sovereign states. The third section 
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presents the theoretical framework. The fourth section presents the research strategy for 
the empirical evaluation of the assumed interrelated effects, the operationalization 
thereof, case selection and data used. In the fifth section, the results of the fsQCA are 
presented and interpreted. Finally, implications for a fuller understanding of the political 
role of CRAs and their ratings during the European debt crisis are formulated. 
 
CRAs as Judges and Shapers of the Public Policy 
CRAs have long been criticized for their business model of ‘secret neutrality’: Since 
more transparency, in their parlance, would allow clients to influence rating decisions, 
thereby damaging the CRAs’ reputation for neutrality, they “resist fiercely any attempts 
to make them more transparent” (Kerwer 2005, 469). Specifically with regards to 
sovereign bonds, the general ‘Guidelines’1 as well as explanations of specific rating 
decisions published by CRAs are very general and allow a great deal of scope for the 
personal opinions of the assessment team (Sinclair 1994; Iyengar 2010). As Sinclair 
(1994, 140) put it, the “composition of the rating committees and the internal 
deliberations within the rating agencies on any particular issue are kept strictly 
confidential”. Most importantly, the CRAs do not state the relative weighting of the 
factors relevant to the rating, which also cannot always be quantified (Cantor and 
Packer 1996; Eijffinger 2012). Accordingly, studies that have tried to identify potential 
factors and their weighting have not produced unambiguous results (Hill et al. 2010; 
Afonso et al. 2011a). 
For states, this opacity is problematic since credit ratings influence the cost of 
borrowing (Kerwer 2005). CRAs act as international private regulators by adjusting 
“the ground rules inside international capital markets and thereby shape the internal 
                                                 




organization and behavior of those institutions seeking funds” (Sinclair 2001, 448; 
Sinclair 1994; Kerwer 2005). Sovereign debt ratings have important implications for 
states and can constrain their scope of policy-making (Paudyn 2013; Afonso et al. 
2011b; Scott 2002). Downgrades or even the threat of a downgrade can jeopardize the 
achievements of implemented austerity measures (Eijffinger 2012). Ferri, Liu and 
Stiglitz (1999) emphasize this point by criticizing the pro-cyclical role of sovereign 
bond ratings during crises, holding them jointly responsible for the decline in the 
economic position of a state. Gärtner and Griesbach (2012) show that in times of crisis, 
following long periods of ‘non-reaction’, CRAs issuing overly-strict rating decisions 
that are not justified by real economic data can trigger self-fulfilling prophecies. 
Accordingly, in the event of a negative rating, refinancing costs rise and the state’s 
ability to service its debt declines, thereby triggering a new downgrade and powering a 
self-perpetuating process which further complicates the implementation of austerity 
measures. In a nutshell, while the CRAs decision making constitutes a black box, the 
consequences emanating from that black box are of crucial importance for rated 
countries, especially in times when public finances already are in dire straits. 
From this viewpoint, it becomes explicit why CRAs can be considered ‘judges’ and 
‘shapers’ of the public policy: If they consider a state’s planned austerity package not 
realizable, the consequence is a downgrade that can lead to increased refinancing costs. 
Rising refinancing costs after a downgrade force countries to adopt even more severe 
austerity measures in order to appease the markets, thus constraining governmental 
activities. It follows that states have a vital interest in knowing the factors that could 
eventually help to break the ‘vicious circle’ of downgrades and rising refinancing costs. 
This study wants to find out how CRAs react to the announcement of an austerity 
program and thereby answer the question whether states can prevent (further) 




On what Grounds can CRAs Reasonably Assess Implementation Credibility?  
When announcing an austerity program, states usually outline only vague details 
regarding the total amount of planned savings, the expected duration of the program, 
and the broad contours of how they aim to achieve their targets. This is little surprising, 
given that announced austerity programs aim to signal to capital markets that a state is 
willing to honor its debt obligations (De Haan and Amtenbrink 2011). The details states 
mention when announcing their intended austerity measures must thus (at least 
theoretically) meet the savings expectations of capital markets. CRAs cannot take these 
signals at face value when they evaluate the fiscal position of states, but subject them to 
a reality check. However, CRAs usually cannot wait for clarification of an austerity 
program before making a judgement, since slow response rates reduce the informational 
value of ratings (Löffler 2005; Posch 2011). Against this background, we assume that 
the kind and size of an austerity program disclosed by states at the time of 
announcement is treated by CRAs as a mere ‘straw man’ that needs to be verified for its 
implementation credibility.  
Like Exadaktylos and Zahariadis (2014) in their recent study on bailout reforms in 
Greece, we draw on Sabatier and Mazmanian’s (1980) widely used conceptual 
framework of the implementation process. This framework is particularly well-suited to 
capture the implementation of austerity measures, which constitute centrally designed 
top-level policy decisions that are often imposed under external pressure where 
“compliance is imposed from the top” (Exadaktylos and Zahariadis 2014, 163). 
Concerning the implementation process, we analyze the degree of centralization to 
address the question of veto points, the strength of the public administration to grasp 
adequate resources and the composition of the ruling government to proxy political 
commitment and set these against macroeconomic variables, namely the level of 
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competitiveness of the economy and the rescue architecture put in place by the 
European authorities since the outbreak of the crisis. 
Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980, 574) see the commitment of officials as crucial for the 
realization of statutory goals: “[a]ny new program requires implementors who are not 
merely neutral but sufficiently persistant to develop new regulations and standard 
operating procedures, and to enforce them in the face of resistance from target groups”. 
Following the party difference theory (Hibbs 1977), the party-political constitution of 
the government during the period when an austerity program is passed and implemented 
matters. Conservative Centre-Right governments typically support and implement 
austerity measures to a stronger degree than Centre-Left and Christian-Democratic 
governments and face less blame for cutting social policy (Giger and Nelson 2010; 
Treib 2004; van Kersbergen 1995). Accordingly, as a first condition, the presence of a 
strong Centre-Right government (CR) should have a positive effect on the reaction of 
CRAs. 
Second, implementation success is determined “by (a) the number of veto/clearance 
points involved in the attainment of statutory objectives and (b) the extent to which 
supporters of statutory objectives are provided with inducements and sanctions 
sufficient to assure acquiescence among those with a potential veto” (Sabatier & 
Mazmanian 1980, 546). A decentralized political system features a larger number of 
veto players that could slow down policy change (Tsebelis 1995), which provides 
opportunities to undermine central decisions and block state interventionism (Huber et 
al. 1993). Austerity programs in particular tend to entail severe and abrupt cuts that can 
affect a wide range of players within the political system and give rise to opposition 
(Exadaktylos and Zahariadis 2014). As a second condition, a high number of veto 
players in a country (DC) could therefore negatively affect the CRAs’ evaluation of the 
likelihood that the austerity program will be successfully implemented. 
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Third, administrative resources are “necessary to hire the staff and to conduct the 
technical analyses involved in the development of regulations, the administration of 
permit programs, and the monitoring of compliance” (Sabatier and Mazmanian 1980, 
545). Established administrative capacities, efficient processes and sufficient financial 
and personnel resources in state administrations improve the efficient implementation of 
austerity programs. As a third condition, the existence of an efficient administration 
(EFF) should thus positively affect the CRAs’ evaluation of implementation credibility.   
By including macroeconomic variables, we can establish whether CRAs consider 
implementation credibility at all or whether implementation-related variables take a 
backseat vis à vis macroeconomic variables (Biglaiser and DeRouen 2007).  
During times of crisis, when sudden and repeated rating changes become more frequent, 
CRAs predominantly base their ratings on projected economic development, since 
retrospective variables such as per capita GDP lose explanatory power (Afonso et al. 
2011a). Projected economic development to a large degree depends on economic 
competitiveness (COM). Compared with other states, those states that are economically 
competitive at the time of the rating decision, despite intensive cost-saving, will in the 
future be able to generate economic growth and, thus, will be able to reduce their debt 
burden and the pressure to reduce costs. The resultant greater likelihood of success 
when implementing an austerity program should be seen positively by CRAs.  
Another macroeconomic variable likely to be considered by CRAs is the safety 
architecture put in place by the European authorities during the survey period, namely 
the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM) or the provision of European Central Bank (ECB) funds to financial markets. 
CRAs on several occasions have hinted that sovereign ratings may depend on the 
guarantees provided by the European authorities (Eijffinger 2012). It is therefore 
plausible to assume that even uncompetitive states are conceded better success estimates 
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by CRAs if they manage to get under the European rescue umbrella. Thus, we assume 
that both comparably high level of economic competitiveness (COM) as well as the 
existence of an established package of rescue mechanisms at the European level (UMB) 
will have a positive effect on the reaction of CRAs. 
Our framework allows to answer the questions whether specific configurations of 
implementation-related factors can halt further downgrades in spite of an unfavorable 
economic environment (comparatively weak competitiveness and/or no support by 
European authorities) and whether overall ‘model’ configurations exist that can 
guarantee positive assessments by CRAs. Taken together, this enables us to shed 
empirical light on the reaction function of CRAs when states announce an austerity 
program. Table 1 shows the conditions outlined above, as well as their expected effects 
on the positive outcome.  
 
Condition Expected direction of influence on 
positive assessment (POS) 
Existence of a strong Centre-Right government 
(CR) 
+ 
High degree of decentralization of the political 
system (DC) 
- 
High quality/efficiency of state administration 
(EFF) 
+ 
High level of economic competitiveness of the 
country (COM) 
+ 
Existence of an extensive package of European 
rescue measures (UMB) 
+ 
Table 1: Conditions and directional expectations for the positive outcome 
 
  
Data and Methods 
For the question of which factors affected the CRAs’ reaction to announced austerity 
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programs, cases are austerity programs passed by state governments.2 We thus assess 24 
austerity programs introduced in 16 countries within the Eurozone or the EU since the 
crisis began during the period from January 2009–May 2012. To focus on the five 
conditions presented above, we employ a Most Similar Systems Design which holds 
important economic contextual factors constant (Przeworski and Teune 1970). Since the 
countries concerned have the same currency or their national currency is tied with the 
Euro, they cannot devalue their currency without restriction as a means of avoiding 
consolidation measures. This enhances the importance of austerity programs. The 
countries also share an internal market and have been undergoing a process of fiscal-
political harmonization since the crisis began.3  
We employ Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) (Ragin 2000; Rihoux 
and Ragin 2008) to identify complex explanations in terms of necessary and/or 
sufficient conditions for positive and negative assessments of implementation 
credibility by CRAs.  
fsQCA is based on the assumption of complex causality, which has three key 
characteristics (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 89): (1) Equifinality means that various 
combinations of existing conditions can lead to the same outcome. (2) Conjunctural 
Causation refers to the fact that any interactions between the influencing factors are 
taken into account and the influence of a condition does not have to be viewed in 
isolation. (3) Asymmetrical Causation means that the occurrence of an outcome can 
have different causes than the non-occurrence. As states are particularly interested in 
                                                 
2 As there is no official document by any international or supranational body that lists 
austerity programs passed in the EU, cases were identified using internet-based 
research. For every case several sources (national and international news services) were 
consulted in order to secure that the announced austerity program had actually been 
adopted by state authorities and its announcement not just used for party political 
purposes. 
3 This includes countries such as the UK or Denmark, since they cannot avoid internal 
devaluation at the expense of currency devaluation. 
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combinations of factors that are eventually able to halt further downgrades, our 
predominant interest lies in the analysis of the positive outcome. fsQCA is specifically 
suitable for a mid-range number of cases, which accommodates the limited number of 
austerity programs passed recently in Europe (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 295-
305). The fundamental case-orientedness of QCA as an approach and the employment 
of post-QCA case analysis allow to control for potential measurement errors in the data 
(Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 307-312). 
fsQCA takes into account the fact “that most social science concepts establish 
qualitative differences between cases in principle, but that cases manifest adherence to 
these criteria in various degrees” (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 16). To this end, 
qualitative anchors are set, which determine the stage at which the condition is deemed 
fully present (‘fully in’; fuzzy value ≥ 0.95) and fully absent (‘fully-out’; fuzzy value ≤ 
0.05). The indifference point is set at 0.5 and establishes difference in kind. For 
instance, fuzzy values above 0.5 indicate that the assessment of implementation 
credibility was rather or fully positive, while values below 0.5 mean that an assessment 
is rather or fully negative. The presence of a set is indicated by capital letters (POS), the 
absence of a set by lower case letters (pos). 
fsQCA is based on fuzzy algebra. It uses the logical operators ‘or’ (+) and ‘and’ (*) to 
depict the combinations of conditions observed in the individual cases (austerity 
programs passed in European countries). A ‘truth table’ is built, which shows all 
possible combinations of conditions (configurations, paths) and attributes the cases to 
them. If all or enough cases’ fuzzy set membership in a truth table row is smaller than 
or equal to its membership in the outcome, then the row is identified as a sufficient path 
for the outcome. During the logical minimization process, the shortest possible 
expression depicting the combinations of factors that imply () the outcome is derived 
– the solution term. For example, where the two paths (combination of conditions in a 
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country that has passed an austerity program) COM*CR*UMBPOS and 
COM*cr*UMBPOS exist it is assumed that the party-political composition of the 
ruling government (CR) obviously has no influence on the reaction of CRAs. 
fsQCA results are evaluated using two parameters of fit that range from 0-1, which 
facilitate an evaluation of the results obtained in terms of their explanatory power. 
Consistency shows the extent to which there are contradictions in the outcome, that is, 
whether there are cases in which the specific form of outcome contradicts the prognosis 
of the solution formula (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 128). Consistency is indicated 
for single truth table rows (raw consistency), single paths of, or the whole solution term. 
Coverage states how well the available empirical information can be explained by the 
solution formula (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 139; Ragin 2006, 291). Raw 
coverage indicates how much of the outcome a single path covers, and unique coverage, 
how much it uniquely covers. For both parameters of fit, the “appropriate levels for 
consistency and coverage are research-specific” (Schneider and Wagemann 2010, 406) 
but are better, the closer to 1. Consistency should not be below 0.75 for sufficient 
conditions, and not below 0.9 for necessary conditions (Ragin 2008, 46). Low coverage 
values indicate that in reality there are evidently other factors that explain the outcome 
and which were not taken into account in the QCA (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 
139).  
We apply the Enhanced Standard Analysis (ESA) procedure and interpret the 
intermediate solution. This means that we make theoretically informed assumptions 
(outlined in Table 1) about empirically unobserved truth table rows (logical 
remainders). We also make sure that these assumptions do not contradict prior findings 
of necessity or sufficiency (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 198-211). Raw data and 
fuzzy set scores, truth tables, directional expectations, complex and parsimonious 




Operationalization and Calibration 
We now turn to the measurement and calibration of the condition and outcome sets, as 
summarized in Table 2. For the operationalization of the conditions, the values that 
were current at the time of the publication of an austerity program in each case are used. 
For the operationalization of the outcome, changes in the rating of a country during a 
specific period following the passing of an austerity program are recorded in order to 
take into account that the agencies occasionally require quite some time to include new 
relevant information in the rating of a country. The period within which a change in 
rating or outlook can be interpreted as a ‘response’ or a reaction of the agencies to a 
passed austerity program is dealt with flexibly on a case-by-case basis (Löffler 2005; 
Posch 2011). The reference value is 4–6 weeks for the duration of a standard rating 
process (cf. Standard and Poor’s 2012, 6). This period between austerity program and 
rating decision allows us to establish causality between the two phenomena.  
Calibration should be transparently based both on theoretical knowledge and with an 
eye on the distribution of raw data in the cases. For some variables, no clear a priori 
theoretical criterion exists for determining membership in a set (e.g., a country’s 
economic competitiveness is per definition a feature relative to other countries’ 
competitiveness). In these cases, we apply well-grounded empirical criteria with an eye 
on the cases’ value distributions (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 32-35). For the 
calibration of fuzzy values we used the direct method of calibration, which applies a 
logistic function to assign the raw data to the different qualitative categories partitioned 
by the qualitative anchors 0.95 (fully membership), 0.5 (point of indifference) and 0.05 
(full nonmembership) (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 35-39). 
 
Outcome: Positive reaction of CRAs (POS).  
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Operationalization. The data foundation for the outcome consists of the ‘Sovereign 
Rating History’ by Fitch Ratings (2012), which shows all changes in rating and outlook 
for all rated countries since rating began. Corresponding data from the other two major 
CRAs, Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s, is not publicly available. This should not, 
however, limit the meaningfulness of the analysis since a significant herd mentality can 
be observed among these market leaders, as manifested in an extremely high correlation 
between the three.4 
Since for present purposes it is not the absolute rating of a country, but rather the 
change in rating or outlook following the passing of an austerity program that is 
relevant, an indicator is constructed which integrates changes in the rating and outlook 
and awards points accordingly. Whole points are awarded for changes in the absolute 
rating of a country; for changes in outlook only half and quarter points, whereby 
positive changes are shown with plus points and negative changes with minus points. 
This distinction expresses the fact that a change in outlook represents a less severe 
change in assessment than an actual up- or downgrade. This method of allocating points 
results in a distribution scale ranging from +0.25 to -2.75.  
Calibration. When determining the cutoffs, the question to be answered is whether the 
absence of a change in rating or outlook (0 points) should be interpreted as more of a 
positive or negative sign on the part of the CRAs. In view of the criticism that CRAs are 
too pessimistic rather than overly optimistic in their evaluations in times of crisis (Ferri, 
Liu and Stiglitz 1999), here, the absence of any change in rating is interpreted as a 
positive reaction and, accordingly, the cutoffs are set at -0.1, -0.26 (point of 
indifference) and -1.75. For mostly previously top-rated countries this means that slight 
                                                 
4 Gaillard (2011) determines correlation coefficients for the three CRAs of more than 
0.97 for the period from 2000 – 2010. Hill et al. (2010) find that disagreements about 
rating quality among the agencies are usually confined to one or two notches on the 
finer scale (which considers both changes in rating and outlook). 
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upgrades or the absence of any downgrade are considered fully-in, while any 
deterioration in outlook (-0.25 points) can be taken into consideration in the analysis as 
a caution or ‘warning shot’, and accordingly is still slightly above the point of 
indifference. Only the downgrades observed in the aftermath of the announcements of 
Greek austerity programs, which “placed Greece, from September 2009 onwards, in a 
sovereign risk class of its own” (Panagiotarea 2013, 1), are considered fully-out. 
 
Strong Centre-Right government (CR).  
Operationalization. This condition is measured through the Comparative Political Data 
Set III 1990-2010 of Armingeon et al. (2012). The percentage share of (ministerial) 
posts held by Centre-Right parties in the government ranges from zero to 100% in the 
cases studied (table 5).  
Calibration. The distribution selected for calibration expresses the idea of a ‘blocking 
minority’ of Centre-Right parties in a government. In cases where the latter have at least 
50% of government posts, one can assume that they exercise significant control on the 
implementation of austerity policies. Hence, we choose 49% as the crucial point of 
indifference that establishes differences in kind. The anchor for full membership was set 
at 89% to make sure that only cases are considered fully-in where there exists not a 
single (potentially influential) ministerial post held by a Christian- or Social-Democrat. 
The anchor for full nonmembership was set at 3%, where the presumed influence of the 
Centre-Right on the implementation of austerity policies can be considered negligible. 
 
Strongly decentralized political system (DC).  
Operationalization. A decentralization index developed by the Assembly of European 
Regions (AER 2009) is used to operationalize this condition. This is an aggregated 
index, which determines and shows autonomy in decision-making and implementation 
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in various areas by means of qualitative and quantitative data on a scale from 0 to 100.  
Calibration. Since ideal-typical situations of “full” or “absent” autonomy are never 
observed in reality, the distribution observed in the cases – which ranges from 63 
(Belgium) to 31 (Greece) – is relevant when determining the cutoff. The individual 
anchors were set at 57 (full membership), 48 (crossover point) and 35 (full 
nonmembership) respectively. The chosen anchors account for larger gaps in the 
observed distribution and achieve an allocation which can also be found more or less in 
this form in similar indices. The anchor at 57, for instance, makes sure that only 
Belgium, Germany, and Spain, widely considered to be the only real federalist countries 
in the present study, are considered fully-in. With a crossover point of 48, 
municipalities and regions in countries with a lower value are relatively less 
autonomous compared to the whole range of observed countries, and vice versa. 
 
High quality/efficiency of state administration (EFF).  
Operationalization. The Governance Indicator developed by Kaufmann et al. (2011) 
both records and evaluates various aspects of governance in the period from 1996 to 
2010. ‘Government Effectiveness’ reflects the quality of the Public Service, the political 
independence of the administration, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation as well as other administration-related aspects measured on a scale from 
-2.5 to +2.5.  
Calibration. The qualitative anchors are set at 1.6 (full-membership), 1.1 (point of 
indifference) and 0.55 (full nonmembership). With this calibration, 11 cases are above 
and 13 cases are below the point of indifference. With the cutoff at 1.6 only countries 
with very strong and efficient administrations such as Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg 
and Austria are considered fully-in. The cutoff at 0.55 considers the two countries that 
have by far the lowest score – Greece and Italy. Countries with considerably stronger 
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and more efficient administrations such as Slovakia, Spain or the Czech Republic are 
still treated more out than in compared to countries such as Germany, France or the 
United Kingdom, yet to a lesser degree. 
 
High economic competitiveness (COM).  
Operationalization. The Global Competitiveness Index of the World Economic Forum 
evaluates and aggregates a large range of data concerning basic conditions for growth, 
efficiency-boosting factors and innovation-boosting factors on a scale from 
approximately 2.7 to 5.8. This index is widely recognized as the most comprehensive of 
its kind in the media and financial industry. 
Calibration. Since the scores can only be interpreted relative to other countries’ scores, 
comparably large gaps in the existing distribution dictate where the cutoffs are set, 
which is at 5.25 (full membership), 5 (crossover point) and 4.1 (full nonmembership). 
The resultant distribution differentiates between the highly competitive countries 
Denmark, Finland and Germany, relatively more competitive countries such as 
Belgium, France, Austria, and the United Kingdom, and comparatively less competitive 
countries such as Latvia, Italy, Spain, or the Czech Republic. Finally, only the cases 
situated in Greece, which has by far the lowest competitiveness scores of the cases 
examined, are considered fully-out. 
 
Existence of a comprehensive package of European rescue measures (UMB).  
Operationalization. The European package of rescue measures took on a concrete form 
in the EFSF and the ESM following several EU summits at the end of 2011, when the 
ECB underwent a change in policy under its new chairman Mario Draghi and began to 
provide money to the financial markets to avert a ‘credit crunch’. 
Calibration. Austerity programs where the reaction of the CRAs was made prior to this 
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point5 are coded with 0; austerity programs evaluated after this time are coded with 1 
(crisp set; indirect calibration method). 
 











Positive reaction of CRAs 
(POS) 
Self-created index based on the ‘Sovereign 
Rating History’ of Fitch Ratings 
- 0.1 - 0.26 - 1.75 
Existence of a strong Centre-
Right government (CR) 
Percentage share of Centre-Right parties in 
government (Comparative Political Data Set 
III 1990-2010 by Armingeon et al. (2012)) 
89 49 3 
High level of decentralization 
of the political system (DC) 
AER Decentralization Index  (2009) 57 48 35 
High quality/level of 
efficiency of state 
administration (EFF) 
Government Effectiveness partial index of 
the Governance Indicator of Kaufmann et al. 
(2011) 
1.6 1.1 0.55 
High economic 
competitiveness of the 
country (COM) 
WEF Global Competitiveness Index 5.25 5 4.1 
Existence of a developed 
European package of rescue 
measures (UMB) 
Dichotomous variable (Relevant Date: 
9.11.2012) 
1 - 0 
Table 2: Measurement and calibration 
 
Results 
In this section, we present the findings of the analysis of sufficient conditions. The 
results of the analysis of necessity did not reveal any necessary conditions. It can be 
found in the supporting information. 
 
Sufficient conditions for a positive reaction of CRAs (POS).  
 





DC*cr + 0.89 0.24 0.07 E, CS1, CS2 
UMB*DC + 1.00 0.28 0.11 B1, B2, A2, I3, CS2 
COM*EFF*CR 0.89 0.46 0.26 FIN, DK, GER, UK, F, B1, B2, 
A1, A2 
                                                 
5 The specific date is December 9 2011, when the decision to resolve the state debt crisis 
in the Eurozone and to consolidate eight other EU-states (The European Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU)) into a factual fiscal union was taken at the Brussels summit. 
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solution consistency: 0.89   
consistency cutoff:  0.832 (next 0.827) 
solution coverage: 0.67     
Table 3: Sufficient conditions for a positive reaction of CRAs (POS) 
 
The solution presented in Table 3 reads as follows: In the cases observed the CRAs 
showed a positive reaction in cases where:  
 
the austerity program was passed in a comparably decentralized country (DC) 
without a ruling Centre-Right government (cr) 
or (+) 
the austerity program was passed in a comparably decentralized country (DC) 
after the end of 2011 (UMB) 
or (+) 
the austerity program was passed in a country with a comparably high level of 
economic competitiveness (COM), a strong administration (EFF) and a Centre-
Right government (CR). 
 
The third path, which has a considerably higher level of empirical relevance than the 
first two paths, as shown by the much higher ‘raw coverage’ score in Table 3 above, 
describes the ‘prototype’ of a highly competitive country with Centre-Right government 
and a strong administration, which is obviously the most successful in fending off 
downgrades by CRAs. The cases covered by this path are without exception highly-
developed economies, namely Finland, Germany, Denmark, the UK, Belgium, France 
and Austria. The raw data (Table 5 in the supporting information) show that these 
countries are all considered highly competitive and display marked differences from all 
of the other countries in which austerity programs were passed. With respect to the two 
other conditions in this path – a strong administration (EFF) and a strong Centre-Right 
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government (CR) – this difference – although present – is far less pronounced. This path 
and the cases it explains correspond to the theoretical expectations.  
This is not the case for the first path, in which the two conditions are diametrically 
opposed to the theoretical expectations. However, with a raw coverage of 0.24, the 
empirical significance of this path is limited; it explains only a few cases – the austerity 
programs announced in Spain (E) and the Czech Republic (CS1, CS2). A look at the 
cases shows that the austerity program passed in the Czech Republic in 2009 displays 
the highest set-membership-values for this path. Possible reasons for a positive outcome 
in this case lie in the early passing of the austerity program and the comparably good 
economic situation in the Czech Republic at that time. In 2009, the debt crisis verifiably 
had not yet reached its highpoint and the Czech Republic was one of the first countries 
in Europe to pass an austerity program in the wake of 2008 (OECD 2013). The second 
path covers comparatively decentralized countries potentially able to resort to an 
existing European rescue architecture. With regard to the condition of a European 
rescue architecture (UMB), this path corresponds to the theoretical expectations. In path 
1 and 2, however, the degree of decentralization (DC) does not occur in the form 
expected from the theoretical framework. Taken together, the explanatory power of the 
third path is highest and, as such, should be afforded more weight in the cross-path 





Figure 1:  Sufficient conditions for the outcome ‚POS‘ 
 
The quality criteria (consistency = .89 and coverage = .67) and Figure 1 show that the 
solution has relatively high explanatory power since it displays a fairly high level of 
consistency and furthermore covers a good proportion of the cases examined. While the 
cases of Spain (E), France (F), and the United Kingdom (UK) are clearly below the 
diagonal, contradicting the statement of sufficiency (since x<y does not apply), none of 
these three cases is actually a true contradictory case, which shows one path of the 
solution but not the outcome. The inconsistency can therefore be tolerated in these cases 
(Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 69). For the positive outcome, finally, post-QCA case-
analysis (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 305-312) needs to consider the programs 
announced in Latvia (LETT), Slovakia (SK), and the second program announced in 
Greece (GR2), which are situated in the upper left quadrant of Figure 1 These cases  are 
left unexplained by our cross-case model since they display the positive outcome (POS) 
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but are not covered by the solution term. Thus, we compare a case with a high 
membership in the outcome but a low membership in the solution to a case with similar 
solution membership but low outcome membership to identify the causes for the 
difference in outcome. Figure 1 shows that the second Greek austerity program (GR2) is 
the only out of a total of four devised programs that were announced in Greece during 
the survey period that was able to temporarily halt further downgrades (POS). A reason 
for this could be the fact that GR2 was the first austerity program in Greece devised 
under close collaboration with the European authorities and the IMF. A closer grip on 
implementation by these actors might have been interpreted positively by CRAs. 
 
Sufficient conditions for the negative outcome (pos). The interest of this paper is in 
identifying conditions that can halt future downgrades when an austerity program is 
announced. The main focus hence is with the positive outcome. Table 4 shows the 
solution for a negative assessment of implementation credibility by CRAs. 
 





umb*com*eff*DC*CR 0.9 0.25 0.25 I1, I2 
solution consistency: 0.9   
consistency cutoff:  0.9 (next 0.63)  
solution coverage: 0.25     
Table 4: Sufficient conditions for a negative reaction of CRAs (pos) 
 
The most salient information in table 4 is the very low solution coverage of .25 what 
basically means that the assessed conditions are not apt to explain the negative outcome. 
This suggests that the positive and the negative rating decision are two distinct 
phenomena which require separate explanations. In the two covered cases, the reaction 
of CRAs were negative when the austerity program was passed in a comparably 
decentralized (DC) and economically uncompetitive (com) country with a Centre-Right 
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government (CR) and weak administration (eff) before the end of 2011 (umb). This path 
corresponds with the theoretical expectations in that the explained cases include Italy 
(I1, I2), with its uncompetitive economy, weak administration and comparably 
decentralized structure, which is not yet able to rely on a functioning European rescue 
architecture. The only condition that contradicts the theoretical expectations is the 
existence of a Centre-Right government (CR). However, in both cases the government 
concerned is that of Silvio Berlusconi, which was never known for fiscal rectitude. 
While these cases confirm the tendency to be more critical of the austerity programs of 
less competitive countries, the explanatory power of this path must not be overrated, 
since with I1 and I2 it explains only two cases of a total of seven that were evaluated 
negatively. As for the positive outcome, post-QCA case-analysis (Schneider and 
Wagemann 2012, 305-312) is thus needed to understand negative rating decisions. We 
therefor compare a case with a high membership in the outcome but a low membership 
in the solution (most deviant case coverage) to a case with similar solution membership 
but low outcome membership in order to identify the causes for the difference in 
outcome. In Figure 2, this is the case for Greece: cases G1, G3, and to a lesser degree 
G4 are deviant cases, G2 is not. Consequently, there must have been other factors or 
conditions taken into account by CRAs when assessing Greece’s implementation 
credibility. One factor can be assumed to lie in the unprecedented ambition and swift 
succession of the austerity programs passed in Greece, which involved a great deal of 
social upheaval and protest (Panagiotarea 2013), and which are likely to have made it 
noticeably more difficult to implement the costs-saving measures. The comparatively 
high level of corruption with its negative impact on political trust (Exadaktylos and 
Zahariadis 2014) is a second factor that may be accountable for the outcome, as 
austerity measures in Greece need to “break thirty year old practices of corruption, 
cronyism, and clientelism” (Panagiotarea 2013, 155; Transparency International 2012), 
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a situation that is unique among the cases considered. These explanations however need 
to be confirmed in further qualitative case study research. 
 
 
Figure 2: Sufficient conditions for the outcome ‘pos’ 
 
Discussion 
With regard to the directional expectations discussed at the outset, the analysis of the 
ratings provides a mixed picture. The most distinct finding is that CRAs evaluate the 
costs-savings efforts of economically competitive states comparably more positively. In 
contrast, sweeping statements regarding implementation-related factors cannot be made 
without question since the conditions Existence of a strong Centre-Right government 
(CR) and High degree of decentralization of the political system (DC) appear in 
sometimes ambivalent forms in the solution paths. The importance of a strong 
administration (EFF) appears greater, but this finding must also be qualified, since it 
cannot be determined unequivocally whether this variable must explicitly be viewed in 
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addition to the (in most cases also present) economic competitiveness (COM). This 
underlines the context dependency of the effect of implementation-related factors, 
which, although often present in the expected forms in the solution paths, take a back 
seat where there are simultaneous macroeconomic factors with greater explanatory 
power. It can also be concluded that the European package of rescue measures (UMB) 
was by no means viewed by the CRAs as a panacea – the individual rescue mechanisms 
provided by the EU constitute plausible assistance first and foremost for smaller 
economies. The condition of economic competitiveness (COM) plays a comparatively 
greater role in the individual solution paths and has a clear influence on the reaction of 
CRAs. It usually represents the ‘stronger’ condition in the individual solutions. In 
various combinations of conditions, it is decisive for the occurrence of the outcome 
even if implementation-related factors do not occur in the form expected from theory. 
The fact that the solution has greater explanatory power for the positive outcome (POS) 
than the solution for the negative outcome (pos) corresponds with the theoretical 
considerations. The study design is specifically tailored to identify conditions or 
combinations of conditions which are able to prevent lower ratings during waves of 
downgrades. 
With regard to the questions posed in the theory section, two inferences can be drawn. 
First, there seems to be no combination of implementation-related factors which is fully 
able to brace itself against an unfavorable economic environment, be it in the form of an 
uncompetitive economy or the absence of European rescue commitments. The cases of 
the first Czech and the Spanish austerity programs do not contradict these findings as 
shown in the explanations for the first path of the positive outcome. Second, an overall 
‘model’ configuration of factors that can increase the chances of getting positive ratings 
(or manage to avoid downgrades) can be identified. In the cases considered, the highly-
developed economies Finland, Germany, Denmark, the UK, Belgium, France, and 
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Austria with their comparably very high economic competitiveness (and also higher, but 
less pronounced membership-values in the conditions strong Center-right government 
and strong administration) all avoided severe downgrades. For these states, announcing 
an austerity program is a worthwhile strategy, since the latter is taken by CRAs as a 
credible signal for future fiscal sustainability. For uncompetitive states, on the contrary, 
this signaling mechanism does not work. They cannot halt sovereign rating downgrades 
and secure access to capital markets by announcing an austerity program. 
The sometimes low coverage of individual paths indicates that the five conditions in 
selected cases have difficulty in explaining in full the outcome in each case. Following 
our exploratory study, post-QCA case-analysis can point towards other explanatory 
conditions. One such condition, potentially taken into account by the CRAs, is the 
degree of political trust – irrespective of its political color – a government enjoys in 
supporting the announced austerity measures and actively encouraging their 
implementation (Exadaktylos and Zahariadis 2014). This could be the case for Italy and 
Greece in particular. Especially with regard to the negative outcome, further research 
should examine other political and macro-economic factors that eventually play a role 
in the rating decisions of CRAs. In any case, our findings for the CRAs have to be 
qualified in that they are solely based on the rating decisions of Fitch Ratings. However, 
due to the exceptionally high correlation coefficients between the three agencies 
(Gaillard 2011) and given that disagreements about rating quality among the agencies 
are usually confined to one or two notches on the finer scale (Hill et al. 2010), we are 
confident that our results contribute to the understanding of the CRAs’ behavior as a 
whole and that the pursued research approach based on fsQCA encourages further 
inquiry into the role and significance of CRAs’ decision-making during specific 




Since the outbreak of the European debt crisis, CRAs have been increasingly accused of 
triggering self-fulfilling prophecies through their severe downgrades, which let 
refinancing costs rise and a state’s ability to service its debt decline. This leads to a new 
downgrade and powers a self-perpetuating process, which is a major impediment to the 
enforcement of austerity programs and structural reform. Obviously, it is of crucial 
importance for states to know the factors that may eventually help to break this ‘vicious 
circle’. The aim of this study was to establish which factors are considered by CRAs 
when they judge a state’s credibility in implementing an announced austerity program 
and thereby answer the question whether countries can successfully signal their will for 
fiscal sustainability by announcing such a program. 
With regard to rating decisions, we have found no combination of implementation-
related factors which is fully able to brace itself against an unfavorable economic 
environment and that, instead, only highly competitive states secure better ratings. 
Given the complexity of implementation processes, our framework sheds light on a 
simple empirical pattern of rating decisions during the European debt crisis. 
Economically competitive states can use the outlined signaling mechanism for their own 
benefit, while for less competitive states this strategy cannot halt rating downgrades. 
While competitive states are deemed better able to generate future growth and therefore 
get positive evaluations, less competitive states cannot prevent (further) downgrades in 
the short or middle-term by announcing austerity programs. For less competitive states, 
the negative consequences that emanate from CRAs’ reaction to announced programs 
and their influence on the cost of borrowing are thus significant; they can only hope to 
receive help from the European authorities to buy the time needed to successfully 
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Table 5: Raw data 
CASE  
(date of first media coverage)  Case ID POS CR DC EFF COM UMB 
Belgium1 (2012-02-14) B1 0.00 54.54 63.00 1.59 5.2 1.00 
Belgium2 (2012-03-11) B2 0.00 54.54 63.00 1.59 5.2 1.00 
Denmark (2010-05-25) DK 0.00 100.00 42.00 2.29 5.46 0.00 
Germany (2010-06-07) GER 0.00 100.00 60.00 1.55 5.37 0.00 
Finland (2012-03-24) FIN 0.00 100.00 45.00 2.24 5.47 1.00 
France (2011-08-25) F -0.25 88.41 42.00 1.44 5.13 0.00 
Greece1 (2010-03-03) GR1 -2.00 73.73 31.00 0.52 4.04 0.00 
Greece2 (2010-05-06) GR2 0.00 73.73 31.00 0.52 4.04 0.00 
Greece3 (2011-06-29) GR3 -2.75 73.73 31.00 0.52 3.99 0.00 
Greece4 (2012-02-13) GR4 -0.50 36.84 31.00 0.52 3.92 1.00 
United Kingdom (2010-06-22) UK -0.25 100.00 49.00 1.56 5.19 0.00 
Ireland (2010-12-07) IR -2.75 86.28 41.00 1.31 4.74 0.00 
Italy1 (2010-10-25) I1 -1.25 100.00 50.60 0.52 4.37 0.00 
Italy2 (2011-08-23) I2 -1.25 100.00 50.60 0.52 4.37 0.00 
Italy3 (2011-12-04) I3 0.00 100.00 50.60 0.52 4.43 1.00 
Latvia (2009-06-16) LETT 0.25 73.40 33.00 0.61 4.26 0.00 
Luxembourg (2010-04-12) LUX 0.00 60.00 31.00 1.71 4.96 0.00 
Austria1 (2010-01-26) A1 0.00 50.00 54.00 1.89 5.13 0.00 
Austria2 (2012-02-10) A2 0.00 50.00 54.00 1.89 5.14 1.00 
Portugal (2010-11-26) P -1.00 0.00 42.00 1.04 4.38 0.00 
Slovakia (2012-05-15) SK 0.00 0.00 36.00 0.88 4.19 1.00 
Spain (2010-05-27) E -0.25 0.00 58.00 0.98 4.59 0.00 
CzechRepublic1 (2009-09-25) CS1 0.25 25.13 50.00 0.98 4.67 0.00 
CzechRepublic2 (2012-04-12) CS2 0.00 45.45 50.00 1.01 4.52 1.00 





Table 6: Fuzzy data 
 CASE ID POS CR DC EFF COM UMB 
B1 0.99 0.61 0.99 0.95 0.92 1.00 
B2 0.99 0.61 0.99 0.95 0.92 1.00 
DK 0.99 0.99 0.20 1.00 1.00 0.00 
GER 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.94 0.99 0.00 
FIN 0.99 0.99 0.33 1.00 1.00 1.00 
F 0.55 0.96 0.20 0.88 0.83 0.00 
GR1 0.03 0.89 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.00 
GR2 0.99 0.89 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.00 
GR3 0.01 0.89 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.00 
GR4 0.38 0.30 0.02 0.04 0.03 1.00 
UK 0.55 0.99 0.58 0.94 0.91 0.00 
IR 0.01 0.96 0.17 0.78 0.30 0.00 
I1 0.12 0.99 0.70 0.04 0.11 0.00 
I2 0.12 0.99 0.70 0.04 0.11 0.00 
I3 0.99 0.99 0.70 0.04 0.13 1.00 
LETT 1.00 0.88 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.00 
LUX 0.99 0.71 0.02 0.97 0.47 0.00 
A1 0.99 0.52 0.88 0.99 0.83 0.00 
A2 0.99 0.52 0.88 0.99 0.84 1.00 
P 0.18 0.03 0.20 0.42 0.11 0.00 
SK 0.99 0.03 0.06 0.23 0.06 1.00 
E 0.55 0.03 0.97 0.34 0.20 0.00 
CS1 1.00 0.16 0.66 0.34 0.25 0.00 






Table 7: Necessary conditions for ‘POS’ and ‘pos’ 
 outcome ‘POS’ outcome ‘pos’ 
 consistency coverage consistency coverage 
CR 0.68 0.68 0.77 0.36 
DC 0.56 0.84 0.40 0.28 
EFF 0.65 0.86 0.36 0.22 
COM 0.57 0.91 0.26 0.19 
UMB 0.45 0.91 0.09 0.09 
cr 0.36 0.77 0.31 0.31 
dc 0.52 0.65 0.76 0.45 
eff 0.41 0.58 0.77 0.50 
com 0.49 0.58 0.87 0.49 
umb 0.55 0.57 0.91 0.43 
The consideration of the individual consistency values shows that no single condition (both in the positive 
and in the negative form) is absolutely necessary for the occurrence of the outcome or, as the case may 
be, for the non-occurrence thereof, since the majority of the consistency values are nowhere near 1. The 
closest is the absence of a package of European rescue measures (umb) with the value of 0.91. However, 
the case GR4 makes clear (cf. Figure 3) that ‘umb’ is not a necessary condition for a negative outcome, 
since in GR4 the negative outcome ‘pos’ (negative reaction of CRAs) exists, but ‘umb’ is not present. In 
other words: there was a downgrade in GR4 despite the existing package of rescue measures. 
 
 






Table 8: Truth table for outcome ‘POS‘ 
CR DC EFF COM UMB number POS consistency 
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1.00 
0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1.00 
1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1.00 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1.00 
1 1 1 1 0 3 1 0.93 
0 1 0 0 0 2 1 0.90 
1 0 1 1 0 2 1 0.83 
0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0.827(*) 
1 0 1 0 0 2 0 0.65 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.61 
1 0 0 0 0 4 0 0.52 
1 1 0 0 0 2 0 0.37 
Notes:  - Prime implicant: DC*UMB 
- Directional expectations: CR  POS; dc  POS; EFF  POS; UMB  POS; COM  POS 
- 15 logical remainders included in minimization: 
cr{0}eff{1}com{1}+cr{0}dc{1}eff{1}+eff{0}com{1}+ dc{1}eff{1}com{0}umb{1} 
 
(*) In order to establish a raw consistency threshold, we first state that a pronounced gap in the 
raw consistency values exists between rows 8 (0.827) and 9 (0.65) of our truth table. However, a 
closer examination of row 8 then reveals that the only case with a membership above 0.5 in this 
configuration is contradictory in a qualitative sense, since its membership in the outcome set is 
below 0.5 (Schneider and Wagemann 2012: 127, 143 ff). We hence exclude row 8 from 




Table 9: Complex and most parsimonious solution for outcome ‚POS‘ 
complex solution raw coverage unique coverage consistency 
CR*EFF*COM + 0.46 0.41 0.89 
cr*DC*eff*com + 0.14 0.07 0.93 
DC*eff*com*UMB 0.09 0.04 1.00 
solution consistency: 0.90   
solution coverage: 0.60   
most parsimonious solution raw coverage unique coverage consistency 
COM + 0.57 0.29 0.91 
cr*DC + 0.24 0.05 0.89 
DC*UMB 0.28 0.05 1.00 
solution consistency: 0.89   






Table 10: Truth table for outcome ‘pos‘ 
CR DC EFF COM UMB number pos consistency 
1 1 0 0 0 2 1 0.99 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.63 
1 0 0 0 0 4 0 0.60 
1 0 1 0 0 2 0 0.58 
0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0.48 
1 0 1 1 0 2 0 0.42 
0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0.37 
1 1 1 1 0 3 0 0.35 
0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0.11 
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0.09 
1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0.06 
1 1 1 1 1 3 0 0.04 
Notes: - Prime implicant: CR*DC*com*umb 
 - Directional expectations: umb  pos; com  pos 




Table 11: Complex and most parsimonious solution for outcome ‚pos‘ 
complex solution raw coverage unique coverage consistency 
CR*DC*eff*com*umb 0.25 0.25 0.90 
solution consistency: 0.90   
solution coverage: 0.25   
most parsimonious solution raw coverage unique coverage consistency 
CR*DC*com*umb 0.26 0.26 0.84 
solution consistency: 0.84   
solution coverage: 0.26   
 
 
